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ABSTRACT 
Both Alfred Marshall and Joseph Schumpeter pronounced on the scope and boundaries of 
economic theory. For Marshall, economics was a broad subject, concerned primarily with 
business and pecuniary matters. Marshall also aligned himself with the methodological ideas 
of Gustav Schmoller, even after the outbreak of the Methodenstreit in 1883. Schumpeter 
reacted differently to the Methodenstreit by arguing that much of the work of Schmoller and 
others in the German historical school was ‘economic history’ or ‘economic sociology’ rather 
than ‘economic analysis’. Also Schumpeter’s close contact with Talcott Parsons and Paul 
Samuelson at Harvard University from 1927 was probably significant in their redrawing the 
boundaries of both economics and sociology, although they did not strictly follow 
Schumpeter’s criteria. Following Lionel Robbins, economics was redefined more narrowly as 
the ‘science of choice’. Sociology was concerned with the explanation of values and ends. 
However, by the 1990s these disciplinary definitions were breaking down, and a major re-
examination of their scope and boundaries is required. 
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Marshall, Schumpeter and the Shifting Boundaries of 
Economics and Sociology 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
Alfred Marshall and Joseph Schumpeter rank as two of the most important and enduringly 
influential economists of all time.1 They both had a major impact on the development of 
economics in the twentieth century. Their writings have several common characteristics, 
including minimal explicit reliance on mathematics, a rich grounding knowledge of the social 
and behavioural sciences, a methodological and philosophical awareness, fluently engaging 
styles of writing, and a primary concern to explain the world rather than to exhibit knowledge 
or technique for their own sake. 
Although Marshall was not the originator of the key idea of marginal utility, in the 1880s he 
played a crucial role by synthesizing the paradigm that Thorstein Veblen (1900, p. 261) was 
later to describe as ‘neoclassical’ (Ekelund and Hébert, 2002). Marshall was the main 
systematizer of the partial equilibrium variant of neoclassical theory, which held sway in 
Britain, the United States and elsewhere until it began to be displaced by the Walrasian 
general equilibrium approach at around the time of the Second World War. Nevertheless, 
Marshall remained hugely influential throughout the twentieth century. 
Both Schumpeter and John Maynard Keynes were born in 1883. Marshall died in 1924, 
leaving his former pupil and the Austrian economist to tackle the catastrophic global events of 
the Great Depression in the 1930s. Schumpeter and Keynes took very different views on this 
issue. Schumpeter (1931) initially proposed that the downturn was the unfortunate but 
unavoidable outcome of the coincidence of the three troughs of the fifty-year Kondratieff 
cycle, with the shorter Juglar and Kitchin cycles. By contrast Keynes (1936) saw the fall in 
‘effective demand’ as the key explanatory factor, and promoted government expenditure to 
increase aggregate demand for goods and services. Keynes’s analysis and policy proposals 
proved more influential at the time. 
In the 1930s and 1940s Schumpeter (1934, 1942) offered other major insights, including 
analyses of the relationship between technological development, political institutions and 
economic activity. Despite these major contributions, overall Keynes was more influential 
than Schumpeter, at least from the 1940s to the 1970s. 
However, since the 1980s Schumpeter’s overall contribution has enjoyed a justified 
renaissance, with an explosion of secondary literature devoted to his life and work. 
Nevertheless, some important and related aspects of his thought are less widely discussed. 
They concern his views on the boundaries of economics as a science and his related appraisal 
of the contribution of the German historical school. Here in several respects there are 
contrasts with the ideas of Marshall. Indeed, the most important argument in this essay is that 
Schumpeter played a role alongside others in redefining the boundaries and scope of both 
                                               
1
 This article makes use of some material from Hodgson (2001). I am extremely grateful to Markus Becker., 
Mark Blaug and Thorbjørn Knudsen for extensive critical comments on a previous draft, including the correction 
of several significant errors. Others including Yanis Varoufalis are also thanked for their helpful suggestions. 
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economics and sociology. A narrower definition of economics emerged in the Anglophone 
world in the 1930s and it eventually displaced the previous and wider definition of the subject 
held by both Marshall and the German historical school. 
The conclusion of this essay assesses this legacy and points out that the boundaries are now 
being transgressed from both sides. This means that a reassessment of the boundaries and 
relations between economics and sociology is in order. 
Marshall and the German Historical School 
The historical school prospered in the German-speaking world from the 1840s to the 1930s 
and went through several phases of development (Hodgson, 2001). Throughout its existence 
its members argued that national economic systems differed substantially in time and place 
and emphasized the importance of historically sensitive theory. However, in its early years 
this school was marked by a naïve empiricism, involving a faith in the explanatory role of 
facts alone. In the opening salvo of the so-called Methodenstreit, Carl Menger (1883) 
developed a powerful methodological attack on these empiricist views. Menger brought the 
thinking and acting individual to the centre of the methodological discussion. He argued that 
some a priori theoretical principles were essential in order to understand economic 
phenomena. 
Furthermore, Menger ([1883] 1985, p. 49) identified ‘that error which confuses theoretical 
economics with the history of economy’ and tried instead to establish a central place in 
economics for deductive and abstract theory. Menger ([1883] 1985, p. 87) argued that 
economics should be concerned with the aspect of human life concerned with economising 
action, that is ‘the manifestations of human self-interest in the efforts of economic humans 
aimed at the provision of their human needs’. Accordingly, the Methodenstreit was not simply 
about methodology, it was also about the legitimate boundaries of economics as a discipline. 
While members of historical school generally retained a broad view of the subject, the 
Methodenstreit caused several of their leaders to refine their methodological views and 
abandon any exclusive reliance on empirical evidence alone. Schmoller (1900, p. 109) 
proposed a combination of inductive evidence with deductive theory as a means of revealing 
and understanding causal relations. His pupil Werner Sombart became the de facto leader of 
the historical school after his teacher’s death in 1917. Notably, Sombart (1929, p. 1) criticized 
‘the mistaken idea that history can be approached without theory’ and attempts ‘to banish all 
theory from the investigation of historical reality.’ For Sombart (1929, p. 3): ‘Theory is the 
pre-requisite to any scientific writing of history.’ The Austria and later historical schools 
differed not in terms of being one against and the other for theory, but on the type of theory 
they proposed. 
Although Marshall was educated largely in England and Schumpeter in Austria and 
Germany, they both were highly influenced by the German historical school.2 Marshall was 
fluent in German. Like many aspiring young economists in the nineteenth century, he went to 
Germany to study under the tutelage of members of the historical school. Contrary to some 
accounts, he was not an opponent of this school of thought (Hodgson, 2001, 2005). 
                                               
2
 The influence of the German historical school on Schumpeter has been more widely discussed. See Machlup 
(1951), Swedberg (1989), Streissler (1994), Chaloupek (1995), Shionoya (1997), Ebner (2000) and Hodgson 
(2000). 
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Marshall’s longstanding opposition to the views of William Cunningham in Cambridge 
focused largely on Cunningham’s (1892) claim that valid general theoretical principles were 
unobtainable and consequently that economics had to be largely descriptive and taxonomic. 
Marshall’s stance did not signal any opposition to the historical school as a whole. Instead, 
Cunningham represented the more naïve empiricist views of some German economists in the 
years before the Methodenstreit. Significantly, even in his critiques of Cunningham, and 
repeatedly elsewhere, Marshall (1895, 1890, 1892, 1897) endorsed key historical school 
arguments (Hodgson, 2001). 
Some commentators take a different view. Robert Skidelsky (1983, p. 43) for example 
stated that Marshall ‘rejected the main contentions of the German historical school’. There is 
no evidence for this. On the contrary, in his works, Marshall heaped praised on Schmoller and 
other German writers, including in the later editions of his Principles. For Marshall, 
Schmoller was a foremost methodological inspiration. In the opening pages of his definitive 
text, Marshall (1920, p. 29) quoted and endorsed Schmoller’s methodological statement that: 
‘Induction and deduction are both needed for scientific thought as the left foot and the right 
foot are both needed for walking.’ In his letters, Marshall repeated this endorsement of 
Schmoller’s attempt to steer a midway course between empiricism and deductivism. Marshall 
wrote on 30 January 1897: ‘Most of the suggestions which I made on the proofs of [John 
Neville] Keynes’s Scope and Method were aimed at bringing it more into harmony with the 
views of Schmoller’ (Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, p. 179). Ten years later, at his address at a 
dinner of the Royal Economic Society, Marshall (1907, p. 7) optimistically declared: 
Disputes as to method have nearly ceased; Schmoller’s dictum that analysis and the 
search for facts are, like the right and left foot in walking, each nearly useless alone, but 
that the two are strong in combination, is accepted on all sides. 
Contrary to a modern myth that Marshall was an opponent of the German historical school, 
Marshall (1920, p. 768) retained a highly laudatory view of their work, seeing it as ‘one of the 
great achievements of our age’ 
Accordingly, Gerard Shove (1942, p. 309) later remarked: ‘If any school of thought outside 
the Ricardian tradition set its mark on the Principles it was the Historical School, rather than 
the marginal utility school, that did so.’ Similarly, Terence Hutchison (1988, p. 529) wrote: 
‘Alfred Marshall, under German influence, made a strenuous attempt to re-graft a historical-
institutional approach on to the neo-classical abstraction.’ 
Overall, rather than taking sides with Menger in the Methodenstreit, Marshall proposed that 
historically grounded insights should enrich and to some extent qualify the apparatus of 
neoclassical theory. His partial equilibrium approach provided scope for data reflecting 
historical, institutional and cultural contexts, within which partial adjustments of price or 
quantity variables may be considered. 
Marshall’s Definition of Economics 
There is not the space here to review earlier conceptions of the scope and boundaries or 
economics. Marshall’s view on this point was broadly consistent with many economists 
before him. William Stanley Jevons (1888, p. vi), for instance, saw economics as the ‘science 
of the development of economic forms and relations’. Similarly, Marshall’s definition of 
economics was sufficiently broad to accommodate historical and other insights within the 
discipline. For Marshall (1920, p. 1):  
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Political Economy or Economics is the study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; 
it examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with 
the attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing. Thus it is on the 
one side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more important side, a part of the study 
of man. 
Although Marshall preferred the term ‘economics’ to the earlier one of ‘political economy’, 
this choice did not for him signal a narrowing of the legitimate subject matter of the 
discipline. On the contrary, Marshall (1920, p. 43) saw political economy as ‘the narrower 
term’ because it often referred merely to discourses on politically desirable economic policies, 
rather than the analysis of ‘the best methods’ of reaching proposed ends. However, in 
adopting a broad definition of the subject, Marshall implicitly leaves space for other social 
sciences, as the scope of economics was not universal. For Marshall (1920, p. 22) economics 
had a core preoccupation: 
‘money’ or ‘general purchasing power’ or ‘command over material wealth,’ is the centre 
around which economic science clusters; this is so, not because money or material wealth 
is regarded as the main aim of human effort, nor even as affording the main subject-
matter for the study of the economist, but because in this world or ours it is the one 
convenient means of measuring human motives on a large scale. 
Hence for Marshall, economics is not exclusively concerned with pecuniary values but they 
are the most convenient data available to examine human motives and behaviour ‘in the 
ordinary business of life’. Within his broad and inclusive conception of the subject, prices and 
other monetary values play central roles. This conceded potential territory to other social 
sciences such as anthropology and sociology, but left the boundaries rather vague. 
He focused on individual motives but did not always take them as given, or entirely self-
regarding. For Marshall (1920, p. 89) tastes were malleable, as ‘the development of new 
activities giving rise to new wants.’ Furthermore, for him, the incorporation of changing 
wants or preferences was entirely within the scope of economic theory. As noted below, this 
inclusive view was later to be overturned by mainstream economists. 
Notably, Marshall did not react to the Methodenstreit by drawing from Menger a narrower 
conception of economics, based on the universal logic of choice based on individual self-
interest. While Marshall defended the role of core theoretical principles, his definition of 
economics remained broad and inclusive. Marshall wrote to Francis Edgeworth on 28 August 
1902: ‘In my view “Theory” is essential. … But I conceive no more calamitous notion than 
that abstract, or general, or ‘theoretical’ economics was economics “proper.”’ (Whitaker, 
1996, vol. 2, p. 393) 
Marshall’s definition of economics in terms of ‘the study of mankind in the ordinary 
business of life’ did not define the discipline in terms of assumptions or methods, but in terms 
of a real object of zone or analysis. However, this zone was not itself sharply defined. 
Economics was instead a locus of concern within the broader social sciences as a whole. This 
picture was consistent with the then influential conception of Auguste Comte who, in defining 
and coining the term ‘sociology’, saw it broadly as the study of society, with economics as a 
specialist and subordinate discipline within. 
Marshall’s wide interpretation of the boundaries of economics endured for several decades. 
This was true in both Britain and the United States at least until the 1940s. This inclusive 
spirit sustained not only capacious disciplinary boundaries but also the tolerance of different 
theoretical approaches and schools of thought. This pluralistic spirit was evident when 
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Edgeworth (1891, p. 1), a leading neoclassical economist and first editor of the Economic 
Journal, opened the first volume: ‘The Economic Journal … will be open to writers of 
different schools. The most opposite doctrines may meet here as on a fair field. … Nor will it 
be attempted to prescribe the method, any more than the result, of scientific investigation.’ 
Notably the American institutionalists, who were dominant in the United States in the 
interwar period, inherited a broad conception of the discipline from both Marshall and the 
historical school. Wesley Mitchell was the most eminent and influential institutional 
economist after the death of Veblen in 1929. Mitchell (1916, p. 157) was echoing Marshall 
when he wrote: ‘Money may not be the root of all evil, but it is the root of economic science.’ 
Like many other institutionalists, Mitchell incorporated key elements of Marshallian theory 
within his work, regarding the two as generally compatible. Veblen is often depicted as taking 
a contrasting, more iconoclastic and anti-neoclassical position. However, in lectures delivered 
in 1926-27, Mitchell (1969, vol. 2, p. 685) pointed out that ‘Veblen himself at times makes 
casual, implicit use of orthodox economic theory’ and gave some evidence in support of this 
contention. 
In sum, Marshall followed the German historical school and others in adopting a relatively 
broad conception of the scope of economics as a discipline. Concerned with ‘the study of 
mankind in the ordinary business of life’ it would focus especially on potentially malleable 
human motives and individual incentives, as particularly expressed in decisions with 
pecuniary outcomes. Consequently from Adam Smith to Marshall, a broad and inclusive 
definition of economics prevailed, in both Germany and the Anglophone world. Economics 
was widely conceived as the study of economic, precuniary or business phenomena. However, 
within a few years of Marshall’s death, this situation was to change radically. 
Schumpeter’s Reaction to the Methodenstreit and His Definitions of Economic Analysis 
Schumpeter (1941, p. 239) long admired the general equilibrium approach of Léon Walras, 
regarding him as ‘the greatest of all theorists’ while rejecting Marshall’s .vision of the 
economic process, his methods, his results’. One of Schumpeter’s enduring but unfulfilled 
ambitions was to dynamize the Walrasian theoretical system. 
Influenced by both the Austrian and German historical schools in the Methodenstreit, 
Schumpeter (1908, pp. 6-7) came to the conclusion that ‘both sides are mostly right … their 
sole difference lies in their interests in different problems.’ He further argued that their 
differences were largely due to different disciplinary preoccupations: compared with Menger 
and his followers, the historical school were less concerned with ‘pure theory’ or ‘pure 
economics’. Schumpeter (1908) upheld the value of contributions on both sides, and 
maintained himself a strong interest in economic development, but he regarded the latter as 
outside the strict realm of ‘pure economics’, which was essentially static in nature (Shionoya, 
1997, pp. 126-9). 
In a work where there is much discussion of the boundaries of economics and its 
subdivisions, Schumpeter upheld in some passages that ‘economic analysis’ or ‘pure 
economics’ started from the assumption of universal regularities in human behaviour such as 
an inverse relation between price and quantity consumed. For example, Schumpeter (1908, p. 
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64) wrote: ‘The fact we see is only that the individual offers a decreasing price. Why he does 
so is not interesting from the standpoint of economics.’3 
On this passage Shionoya (1997, p. 116) comments: ‘It is clear that when Schumpeter said 
this he had Menger in mind.’ But Schumpeter went further than Menger, to declare that the 
causes of wants and how they are satisfied were outside the realm of economic theory. 
Psychology as a whole was seen as separate from economics. This exclusion of psychological 
insights from economics was too radical even for some Austrians, and it drew criticism from 
Schumpeter’s teacher Friedrich von Wieser (Shionoya, 1997, pp. 117-18). Instead 
Schumpeter focused foundationally on presumed regularities of exchange behaviour. 
Although Schumpeter did not use these terms, this idea was consistent with the views of 
Menger and others who upheld that in economics wants or preference function are taken as 
given.4 Like many other economists that take such a basic view, Schumpeter accepted that 
wants may change, but saw the investigations of these causes as outside economic analysis. 
Similarly, Schumpeter (1909, p. 216) wrote in an article published in English in the 
following year: ‘For theory it is irrelevant why people demand certain goods: the only 
important point is that all things are demanded, produced, and paid for because individuals 
want them.’ For him, the task of theory was to consider the outcomes of individual decisions, 
individual interactions and their consequences, but not on the causes of their wants or 
preferences.5 
Schumpeter (1908) defined the overall subject matter of ‘economics’ in terms of the formal 
analysis of ‘exchange relations’ or catallactics. Influenced in this respect by Walras, 
Schumpeter saw the basic unit of analysis as the reciprocal transfer of goods. Also like 
Walras, Schumpeter retained the concepts of utility and utility maximization. As Shionoya 
(1997, p. 134) puts it, ‘the quantity of goods and utility functions were assumed as given, but 
this assumption was made to treat the phenomenon of exchange as the first step in the 
analysis.’ 
Schumpeter (1908) went further than Walras, however, in regarding ‘exchange’ as a highly 
general concept, occurring in production and consumption as well as trade. Schumpeter’s aim 
was to demarcate and develop an ahistorical and highly abstract system of ‘pure economics’, 
applicable to all past and possible forms of human activity. Any study of historical specific 
institutions was thus outside ‘pure economics’ thus conceived. 
Adopting the ideals of this abstract and general project, he maintained a view that other 
approaches were not economic theory proper. Schumpeter (1928, p. 363) wrote in the 
Economic Journal: ‘within serious economic theory there are no such things as “schools” or 
                                               
3
 See Schumpeter (1908, pp. 64-8, 77-9, 85-91, 154-5, 261, 541-7). 
4
 As Shionoya (1997) explains, Schumpeter was strongly influenced by Ernst Mach’s positivism and its stress on 
observable behaviour. Hence in his 1908 book Schumpeter focuses on the behavioural regularities rather than 
explicit assumptions about wants or preferences. However, in its demarcating effects, his 1908 position is 
identical to the idea of taking wants as given, or assuming given preferences, as a basis for the definition of the 
boundaries of economic theory. 
5
 Schumpeter (1909, p. 216) also admits the study of ‘social wants’ as within economic theory, but only on 
condition that they can be accounted for by ‘individuals acting as a community consciously and jointly’. Again, 
for him, the appropriate focus for theory is on explanations in terms of individuals, but not on explanations of the 
origins of individual wants themselves. 
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differences of principles, and the only fundamental cleavage in modern economics is between 
good work and bad.’ However, in a Japanese journal in 1931 Schumpeter later modified this 
view to the empirical claim that there are ‘no differences as to fundamental standpoints 
among serious economists’ but he was unclear as to whether institutionalists or members of 
the historical school were included in this ‘serious’ group (quoted in Shionoya, 1997, p. 63). 
Overall, Schumpeter allowed only no more than a highly limited plurality of approaches 
within the core of theoretical economics. 
After 1908 Schumpeter rarely revisited his definition of economics in terms of the formal 
analysis of ‘exchange relations’ or catallactics. While he gave more and more attention to 
dynamic analysis and economic development, some but not all later statements suggest the 
retention of a narrow definition of ‘economic analysis’. In some passages he broke the strict 
stipulations of the boundaries of economics in his 1908 book; in other mature statements he 
reaffirmed them.6 
For example, in a posthumously published book, Schumpeter (1954, p. 21) wrote: 
‘economic analysis deals with the questions how people behave at any time and what the 
economic effects are they produce by so behaving; economic sociology deals with the 
question how they came to behave as they do.’ Although Schumpeter had made other 
statements with different connotations, this statement by him is consistent with the postwar 
consensus established by Lionel Robbins, Paul Samuelson and Talcott Parsons. Note that 
‘economic’ in this passage is the adjective rather than the noun in both ‘economic sociology’ 
and ‘economic history’. Schumpeter promoted neither ‘sociological economics’ nor 
‘historical economics’ as descriptive terms. This logically would suggest that economic 
sociology is a branch of sociology and economic history is a branch of history, neither being 
in economics proper. 
However, Schumpeter did not consistently pursue this line of argument in his work as a 
whole, and after 1908 he is generally vague about the boundaries of ‘economics’ as such, 
apart from occasional and important statements concerning the inclusion of ‘history’ and 
‘statistics’ within economics. For example, in another passage in this last book, Schumpeter 
(1954, p. 12) elliptically and briefly put ‘history’ as part of ‘economic analysis’. 
Nevertheless, in yet another passage from this book, Schumpeter (1954, p. 819) suggested 
that the study of institutions, including ‘economic institutions’, was the subject matter of 
‘economic sociology’ rather than economics. One awkward logical consequence is that if 
markets are institutions, as several economists and sociologists uphold (Fligstein, 2001; 
Hodgson, 1988; Lie, 1997; Solow, 1990), then the study of markets is not the subject of 
economic analysis. Another awkward corollary is that the work of ‘new institutional 
economists’ – including Oliver Williamson and Nobel Laureates in economics such Ronald 
Coase and Douglass North – do not qualify as economic theory or analysis by Schumpeter’s 
(1954, p. 819) suggestion. However, as noted below, Schumpeter somewhat qualified his 
position elsewhere, by recoiling from such restrictions. He did not follow the logic of this 
remark to its conclusion and more generally his statements on these issues are patchy, 
incomplete and partially inconsistent. 
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 Schumpeter later expressed some dissatisfaction with his 1908 position. Ludwig Lachmann recollected that in 
in London 1936 Robbins asked Schumpeter why Das Wesen had not been published into English. Schumpeter 
replied: ‘Because I don’t like it … There are things in it I no longer believe’ (Mittermaier, 1992, p. 11). 
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Ironically, much of Schumpeter’s work, largely upon which his currently high reputation is 
built, was in the sphere of ‘economic sociology’ by some of his definitions. This is true of 
especially influential works such as his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). 
Schumpeter frequently narrowed the definition of ‘economic analysis’ but always he saw it as 
extremely important to broaden the mind by travel across its boundaries. He also argued that 
the social science disciplines should learn from one another. 
As Shionoya (1990, 1997) highlights, a key piece of evidence here is the seventh chapter in 
the Theory of Economic Development, omitted from the second German edition and from the 
English translation (Schumpeter, 1912, 2002). Here Schumpeter (2002, p. 94) argues that after 
the study of the ‘static system … economic development poses the second most important 
problem faced by economists’. This chapter has a particularly interesting passage, suggesting 
some equivocation. Schumpeter (2002, p. 97) writes:  
Pure economic laws are similar to the laws of mechanics which tell us how bodies with 
mass behave under the influence of any external ‘forces’, but which do not describe the 
nature of those ‘forces’. … In the same way pure economics provides us with formal 
laws as to how the economy is shaped under the influence of conditions coming from the 
outside. … Therefore, in such a conception, pure economics almost by definition 
excludes the phenomenon of a ‘development of the economy from within’. 
Yet in the next paragraph Schumpeter (ibid.) immediately qualifies the above statement: 
Only rarely will such a conception be formulated explicitly. Frequently, it is the very 
reason for the silence of the theoreticians on the phenomenon of development itself; this 
corresponds to the standpoint of many of the best theorists. We do not completely deny 
that such a conception might be justified. It is true that this way of thinking corresponds 
to the fundamental principles of static economics. … Those static laws are the basis of a 
scientific understanding of the economy. And to explain those effects is an important task 
of theoretical economics. As an abstraction, this conception is justified, even 
indispensable. 
Observe the equivocation here. After noting with regret that traditional ‘pure economics 
almost by definition’ excludes the critical phenomenon of economic development, 
Schumpeter cannot quite bring himself to overturn this definition. Hence the equivocal 
phraseology when he does ‘not completely deny that such a conception might be justified’. 
But he does not partially deny it either.  
Nevertheless, this seventh chapter is an important piece of evidence that Schumpeter 
wished to establish a broader conception of economics in which economic development and 
dynamics were major themes. Shionoya (1990, 1997) suggests on the basis of this chapter that 
Schumpeter was moving towards the idea of a unified social science. Perhaps so, but the next 
section shows that Schumpeter remained equivocal on the important matter of the boundaries 
between the social sciences. 
Schumpeter’s Journey to Harvard 
Schumpeter’s explicit attitude to the German historical school shifted remarkably in a short 
period of time. This period coincides with the shift of Schumpeter’s interests and employment 
from the University of Bonn in Germany to Harvard University in the United States. As a 
result of this move, Schumpeter was involved with authors who played a major part in the 
redrawing the boundary between economics and sociology, and who helped to establish the 
consensus on these disciplinary boundaries after the Second World War. 
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We address these developments chronologically. As late as 1926 Schumpeter published a 
sympathetic account of the work of Schmoller and other historical school theorists. In this 
article Schumpeter (1926a, pp. 3, 18, 22, 24 n., 46) wrote of Schmoller’s ‘great 
achievements’, of his ‘greatness’, of his work being ‘the programme for the future’, of ‘his 
overall achievements’ and of his ‘success’. In the same article, Schumpeter saw much merit in 
the work of the leading American institutionalist Wesley Mitchell. Although he also raised 
thoughtful criticisms, the disposition was largely positive. Within four years, however, 
Schumpeter was to shift the balance of his assessment of historicism and institutionalism, 
towards criticism alone. 
Schumpeter made another significant decision at this time. In producing the second (1926) 
German edition of his Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter decided to drop its rich 
and important seventh chapter, discussed above. This chapter was also omitted from the later 
English edition (Schumpeter, 1912, 1926b, 1934). On this issue, John Mathews (2002, p. 2) 
asks: 
Why then, did Schumpeter drop this innovative chapter from the second edition, and 
never refer to it again in his own published work? There is no clear or easy answer to this 
question. Perhaps he saw it as too precocious, too bold, and not appropriate for a mature 
man who by now aspired to a professorship at Harvard … 
There is no evidence that Schumpeter wanted a job at Harvard as early as 1926, and he 
certainly continued for a while to retain professional aspirations in Germany. However, 
Harvard was definitely in his sights, as he was a visiting professor at that university in 1927-
28. At a time when many leading US departments of economics were dominated by 
institutionalists, Harvard inclined more to neoclassical ideas. An obvious explanatory 
hypothesis is that the broader conception of economics suggested in this chapter of the 1912 
work was seen as too inclusive for the sensibilities of Harvard economists. His 1926 book was 
of course published in German, but at that time the majority of US economists could read that 
language, given the relative global importance of the German literature in economics. Also 
after 1926, Schumpeter became more openly critical of the historical school and highly 
dismissive of the institutionalist tradition.7 
In the Harvard-based Quarterly Journal of Economics Schumpeter (1930, p. 158) referred 
scathingly to the intellectual capacities of both Schmoller and Veblen, and to ‘the serious and 
even glaring defects in their equipment, both natural and acquired.’ Schumpeter (1930, p. 
159) also pronounced on the ‘unsatisfactory state of economic science in Germany’ and 
dismissed Veblen’s work without adequately detailed criticism. In a talk in Japan in 1931, 
Schumpeter (1991, p. 292) referred to the ‘methodological errors of German historians’. He 
also described institutionalism as ‘the one dark spot in the American atmosphere’. Overall, 
there was a remarkable transformation from Schumpeter’s sympathetic 1926 article on 
Schmoller, to the largely hostile statements of 1930-31, in which Schumpeter was keen to 
dismiss, and to detach himself from, the entire German historical school and American 
institutionalism. These negative statements may have aided his application for a permanent 
post in Harvard. 
                                               
7
 Strikingly, some of the positive appraisals of German historicists in Schumpeter (1926b) were removed from 
the first English edition of that work. Compare, for instance, the positive footnote on Sombart in Schumpeter 
(1926b, p. 90 n.) with Schumpeter (1934, p. 61). 
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Schumpeter attained a permanent post in Harvard in 1932. He had really wanted to get 
Sombart’s former chair in Berlin when it became vacant in 1931 but he was unsuccessful. 
Schumpeter’s move to Harvard coincided with an increasing criticism of both the 
institutionalist and historical school traditions.8 Yet the irony is that Schumpeter continued 
throughout his life to draw on the work of the German historical school and many of 
Schumpeter’s ideas are traceable to their leading scholars.9 
At the same, Schumpeter’s residence in Harvard provided him with the opportunity to 
participate in discussions concerning the redrawing of the boundaries of economics itself, and 
particularly between economics and sociology. In this and other respects, his personal 
contacts with both Parsons and Samuelson in Harvard were important. 
The Recasting of Economics and Sociology 
Previously educated in the American institutionalist tradition, 1927 Parsons was appointed an 
instructor in economics at Harvard University. He took Schumpeter’s economics classes and 
discussed a number of issues with him (Brick, 1993). At this time, Parsons was shifting away 
from institutionalism and was becoming more sympathetic to the mainstream economists at 
Harvard (Camic, 1992). Schumpeter encouraged Parsons to study the work of Vilfredo Pareto, 
which had attracted the interest of a number of Harvard economists. Importantly for Parsons’s 
line of research, Pareto had attempted a general theory in both economics and sociology, and 
tried to establish a boundary between the two disciplines.  
Parsons had previously studied in Germany and was a translator of some of Max Weber’s 
works into English. As David Zaret (1980, p. 1193) has argued, ‘Parsons saw in Weber’s 
writings a non-Marxian foundation for general theory.’ The general theory for which Parsons 
aspired was to be even more general than the Paretian and Walrasian approaches admired by 
Schumpeter. As Hans Joas (1995, p. 275) pointed out: ‘by dint of the approach he was taking, 
Parsons realized that he was being forced out of the prestigious discipline he had started his 
career in.’ In 1931 Parsons transferred to a newly founded department at Harvard, which was 
eventually named the department of sociology. ‘Sociology offered Parsons a way out of this 
personal and theoretical crisis as well as a solution to the problem of the definition of the 
proper field of economics’ (ibid.). 
Parsons became deeply engaged with the problem of demarcation between economics and 
sociology. To accommodate culture and institutions while rejecting the role of biology or 
instinct, sociology itself had to be transformed. Furthermore, it had to reach a new modus 
vivendi with the rising new wave of neoclassical economics and preserve its own intellectual 
territory. As Parsons (1970, p. 827) himself remarked: ‘It gradually became clear to me that 
economic theory should be conceived as standing within some sort of theoretical matrix in 
which sociological theory also was included.’ 
Parsons and Schumpeter were both strongly influenced by Pareto and his distinction 
between ‘logical’ and ‘non-logical’ actions. Pareto saw ‘logical’ actions as being those where 
means were consistent with, and appropriate for, the given ends. For Pareto (1971), the study 
                                               
8
 A possible but unproven motive for this shift is discussed in Hodgson (2001, pp. 189-90). 
9
 For example, Schumpeter’s famous phrase ‘creative destruction’ has a precedent in a work by Sombart (1913, 
p. 207). See also Appel (1992, pp. 260-2). 
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of such ‘logical’ actions was the domain of economics. On the other hand, like Weber, Pareto 
(1935) upheld that the residual class of ‘non-logical’ actions governed much of human 
behaviour. Such actions were seen as the subject matter of sociology. Accordingly, economics 
was a limiting case of the broader theory of social action that it was the task of sociology to 
build. 
At about the same time, Robbins at the London School of Economics was working on a 
radical redefinition of the scope and boundaries of economics. Particularly influenced by 
economists of the Austrian school, Robbins redefined economics as the universal ‘science of 
choice’. For him, economics was about the rational choice of means to serve given ends. The 
‘economic problem’ was then to determine the best means available to meet those given ends. 
It applied to all economic systems, as long as there were choices to be made and a scarcity of 
resources. Economics was no longer defined in terms of a real object or zone of analysis, but 
in terms of specific assumptions and methods. 
Parsons (1934) appraised Robbins’s (1932) influential book in an important essay in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. For Parsons, in contrast to Robbins, ends and means could 
not entirely be separated. Furthermore, ends could not always be taken as ‘given’ because 
they were likely to be affected by the processes involved in their attainment. Second, Parsons 
stressed that social action was always framed and driven by social and institutional norms.  
Crucially, however, Parsons did not reject to this redefinition of economics. In fact, it 
served his purposes. By defining economics narrowly, as the science of rational choice, 
Robbins conceded a substantial territory to the sociologist. For Parsons, sociology was about 
the social and normative origin of the ends that Robbins had taken as given. 
Parsons’s tactic was to show that Robbinsian economics had to be grounded upon a general 
sociological theory. Economics would focus merely on the examination of the logical 
relationships between means and given ends. Sociology would then assume its place as the 
study of the social origin of the ends. Hence, Parsons (1937, p. 768) defined sociology as ‘the 
science which attempts to develop an analytical theory of social action systems in so far as 
these systems can be understood in terms of the property of common-value integration.’ This 
definition of the subject was not in terms of the analysis of ‘social action systems’ as a whole, 
but in terms of the impact and integration of common values. Sociology was thus defined as 
the study of an aspect of the social system. It had a delineated domain of enquiry. The study 
of other features was conceded to economists and others. 
An implicit contract emerged between both economists and sociologists. Economics was 
henceforth to concerns itself with the rational choice of means to serve given ends; sociology 
was to be concerned with the explanation of those values and ends. With Robbins (1932), 
economics became the ‘science of choice’ without much consideration of what ‘choice’ 
actually meant in philosophical terms. Under Parsons (1937, p. 768) sociology was 
reconstructed as ‘the science … of social action’ without much discussion of the materialist 
causes behind intention or action itself. 
Crucially, both Parsons and Robbins avoided any direct and integrated analysis of socio-
economic structures and institutions as a whole. Each of them focused on a selected analytical 
aspect. Each science was defined in terms of concepts and assumptions, rather than real 
objects of enquiry. Neither addressed the structured reality in its totality. By contrast, 
Schumpeter retained a strong integrating ambition in his work. 
Both economics and sociology became redefined in terms of the study of types of analytical 
problem rather than in terms of the explanation of a distinct reality. They became 
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compartmentalised, self-reflective discourses. After Parsons and Robbins, no social science 
addressed the study of socio-economic systems as a whole. The Comtean vision of a unified 
social science was finally abandoned. 
Samuelson was a student of Schumpeter at Harvard in the 1930s. When Samuelson (1947, 
1948) re-laid the foundations of postwar neoclassical economics and published his best-
selling textbook, he adopted Robbins’s definition of economics. Samuelson synthesized the 
approaches of Walras and Pareto in microeconomics with a version of Keynesian 
macroeconomics. Following Robbins, he took individual preference functions as given. 
It is inconceivable that Schumpeter did not discussed the boundaries between economics 
and sociology with Parsons. Schumpeter’s ideas on this topic probably influenced both 
Parsons and Samuelson, although neither adopted them in exact terms. On the other side of 
the Atlantic, Robbins (1932) made several references to Schumpeter (1908), including 
criticism of Schumpeter’s definition of economics as the science of ‘exchange relations’. 
At least until the 1970s, the Parsonian approach dominated sociology, along with his 
conception of the scope and boundaries of the subject. Despite the huge influence of Marshall, 
especially in the first half of the twentieth century, economics in the second half generally 
defined itself in narrower and Robbinsian terms, as the ‘science of choice’ taking purposes or 
preferences as given. 
Although Schumpeter’s extensive involvement in discussions with Parsons is well 
documented, there is no evidence that he approved of the emerging Robbins-Parsons 
consensus on the boundaries of economics and sociology. However, apart from such rare 
instances, it is also remarkable that he seemed reluctant to declare openly and forcefully his 
views on the legitimate and more inclusive boundaries of economics, at a critical time. 
One of the mysteries concerning Schumpeter’s role in this major redefinition of disciplinary 
boundaries was that he did not intervene more strongly, especially given his emphasis on 
economic evolution and dynamic transformation. Statements to this effect in the crucial 
period of the 1930s are extremely rare, despite his close connections at Harvard with two of 
the three most important players involved. 
For example, in his 1937 preface to the Japanese edition of the Theory of Economic 
Development, he criticized Walras for conceiving of economic theory in static terms. 
Schumpeter also rejected the view that ‘as economic theorists we cannot say much about the 
factors that account for historical changes’. He called instead for ‘a purely economic theory of 
economic change’ and upheld that he was trying to build such a theory (Clemence, 1951, pp. 
159-60). There is a significant contrast here with his 1908 position. 
On the other hand, we have to take into account the later statement, quoted above, where 
Schumpeter (1954, p. 21) describes ‘economic analysis’ and ‘economic sociology’ in terms 
that are consistent with the postwar Robbins-Parsons consensus on the boundaries between 
economics and sociology. Furthermore, during the 1930s and 1940s Schumpeter witnessed 
the much-delayed rise in popularity of the Walrasian general equilibrium approach, which 
Schumpeter himself had championed many years earlier. 
However, in his final essay, there is a hint that he was worried about some of the 
consequences of the Robbins-Parsons consensus and the rise of general equilibrium theory. 
His concern was that the study of historical and institutional factors would be diminished 
within economics, as the discipline became more focused on formal models. Schumpeter 
(1951, p. 308) thus wrote: ‘there is an argument for historical or institutional study in almost 
any department of economics.’ 
 - 13 - 
But it was too little and too late. The Robbins-Parsons redefinitions had already taken hold. 
Contrary to Schumpeter’s personal example and inclinations, economics recast as the 
narrower ‘science of choice’ rapidly underwent a ‘formalistic revolution’ (Ward, 1972; Blaug, 
1999, 2003) and excluded many Marshallian concerns from the very scope of ‘economics’ 
itself. 
It seems overall that Schumpeter played an equivocal rather than a leading or decisive role 
in the recasting of the boundaries of economics in the 1930s and 1940s. Significantly, in the 
crucial debates of the 1930s, he mounts no strong defence of broader boundaries in any work 
intended for an English-speaking audience. In that critical decade he failed to challenge 
openly and directly the budding Robbins-Parsons consensus. But there is some evidence in 
the last years of his life that he was concerned about the emerging outcome. 
Conclusion: The End of the Parson-Robbins Consensus and the Need for Redefinition 
It has been shown above that Schumpeter was involved in intellectual circles that changed the 
prevailing definition of economics from the Marshallian study of the ‘ordinary business of 
life’ to the narrower Robbinsian ‘science of choice’ and shifted the definition of sociology 
from the Comtean science of society to the Parsonian emphasis on the origin and integration 
of values. Schumpeter at least played the role of a catalyst in this shift, although the outcome 
was significantly different from his own various views on the boundaries of ‘economics’ or 
‘economic theory’. 
The Robbins-Parsons conceptions of the nature and boundaries of both economics and 
sociology endured from the 1930s to the 1980s. The result of the Robbins-Parsons settlement 
was that economics and sociology were each concerned with an aspect of the social system as 
a whole. ‘Sociology’ existed, but no science was devoted to the study of the whole society. 
‘Economics’ endured, but no science was principally devoted to the study of the economy as 
such. Ironically, despite his role in this schism, Schumpeter’s own work retained a strong 
integrative and interdisciplinary character. 
However, by the end of the twentieth century, the Robbins-Parsons settlement had 
crumbled. The core concepts in each discipline came under attack. Furthermore, researchers 
calling themselves ‘economists’ or ‘sociologists’ enthusiastically trespassed on the traditional 
domain of the other discipline. We can observe both these effects in each discipline, involving 
challenges to core ideas and open trespassing on territories claimed by other disciplines. 
Within sociology, the Parsonian hegemony eventually crumbled after sustain criticism from 
all sides. Due to James Coleman (1990) and others, rational actor models invaded sociology 
as well as political science. 
On the other side, ‘economists’ such as Gary Becker (1981) ventured into the ‘sociological’ 
territory of marriage and the family. Also, within economics, game theory showed that the 
concept of rationality was itself insufficiently well-specified, and experimental economists 
became increasingly persuaded by evidence that seemed to undermine the rationality 
assumption (Sugden, 1991; Kahneman, 1994; Kagel and Roth, 1995). In contrast to the 
former emphasis on given preferences, several leading economists now admit endogenous and 
situation-dependent preference formation in economics (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Bowles, 
1998, 2004).10 Based in part on evidence from interviews of graduate students at the most 
                                               
10
 A much earlier admission is found in Hammond (1976). 
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prestigious departments of economics, David Colander (2005b, p. 930) has studied how the 
next generation of mainstream economists are abandoning the ‘“holy trinity” assumptions of 
rationality, greed and equilibrium.’11 
Consequently, with the erosion of core concepts on both sides, the very meaning and 
identity of ‘economics’ and ‘sociology’ are open to question. Furthermore, previously 
established frontiers between the disciplines are being transgressed from both sides. Despite 
claims to the contrary, there are no adequately specified accounts that ‘economics’ or 
‘sociology’ can be defined in terms of their core methods or results (Kalleberg, 1995; 
Velthuis, 1999; Zafirovski, 1999; Rojas, 2006; Hodgson, 2007). Particular methodological 
claims and related definitions are contested by multiple dissenting voices from within each 
discipline. 
These circumstances call for a concerted re-examination of the boundaries between 
economics and sociology, the nature of each subject and its subject matter, and the 
subdivisions within the social sciences as a whole. This is one the most important – but 
hitherto neglected – tasks for economists and sociologists at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. Yet I hazard to suggest that in such circumstances both Marshall and Schumpeter 
would have fully appreciated its urgency. 
                                               
11
 See also Colander (2005a), Colander et al. (2004a, 2004b), Davis (2006). 
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